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The recent surge of legal happenings in 
and around the White House leads one 
here in England to reflect on what would 
be our own law's equivalents or 
responses. After all, impeachment was an 
English legal antique when the US 
constitution took in a colonial 
reproduction - the grand jury, another 
English export, we dumped long ago. 
Good riddance to both. But other aspects 
of the Clinton affair raise legal issues, in 
particular about lawyer-client 
confidences, which remain unsettled on 
both sides of the Atlantic.
LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
AFTER DEATH
In 1993, seven members of the White 
House travel office staff were 
peremptorily dismissed. A congressional 
investigation was launched into these 
dismissals. Vince Foster, a member of the 
White House staff presumably concerned 
in the affair, spent two hours with his 
lawyer, James Hamilton, at which 
interview Hamilton took hand-written 
notes. Nine days later Foster committed 
suicide. In December 1995, the 
Independent Counsel, Mr Kenneth Starr, 
sought to subpoena Hamilton and his 
firm, Swidler & Berlin, to provide his 
notes for the federal grand jury inquiring 
into the affair. Hamilton claimed 
privilege. The district court upheld his 
claim. The Court of Appeals reversed 
this, on the ground that once a client is 
dead the claim to privilege must be 
balanced against the importance of 
disclosure for the needs of a subsequent
criminal case. But the Supreme Court 
upheld the claim by six votes to three 
(Swidler & Berlin v US (1998) 118 S Ct 
2081). They said that the justification for 
the privilege is the willingness of the 
client to confide in his lawyer in the 
knowledge that his confidences will be 
protected; a willingness which might be 
diminished if the client knew that 
posthumous revelation was possible. The 
only exception acknowledged by the 
court was the 'testamentary exception' 
where a lawyer might be required to 
reveal a deceased client's 
communications so as to settle any 
disputes between beneficiaries.
Pausing to look at English law in these 
matters, it seems well settled. The 
privilege certainly survives the death of 
the client (Bullivant v A-G [1901] AC 196, 
206) as does the power to waive it (Re 
Molloy [1997] 2 Cr App R. 283). The 
'testamentary exception' also exists (see, 
e.g. Re Williams [1985] 1 All ER 964, 
where it was taken for granted that a 
letter sent by the testatrix to her lawyers 
was properly revealed to assist in 
construing her home-made will).O '
However, we would define it more 
widely. From Conlon v Conlans Ltd [1952] 
2 All ER 462, a commercial case, it seems 
that a court may infer that a client's 
communication to his lawyer was 
intended to be passed on, in the event of 
certain subsequent circumstances, and 
will so order. And indeed, this 
generalised approach seems to be gaining 
professional acceptance in the USA:
'A lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to representation of a client ... except 
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in 
order to carry out the representation ...' (Rule 
1.6 of American Bar Association (ABA) 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1996)
DURABILITY OF THE 
PRIVILEGE
If death does not terminate the 
privilege, what does? The traditional 
answer of our courts is 'once privileged 
always privileged'. So in Crescent Farm v
Sterling [1972] Ch 553, a successor in 
title was held to be entitled to withhold a 
document containing the legal advice 
given to his predecessor and passed on to 
the successor. The interval of years was 
not very long but could have been 
generations, presumably. But would our 
courts countenance a balancing 
exception of the sort argued for in the 
Supreme Court case? Supposing it is very 
many years afterwards and supposing 
there is someone representing the long- 
dead client and purporting to invoke the 
privilege, may a court take into account 
the evaporation of the rationale, the time 
elapsed, the public or historic interest, 
the lack of any adverse effect on any 
individual, the availability of some of the 
information in the public domain, and 
such similar factors?
To all such arguments the House of 
Eords have given a resounding 'no'. In R 
v Derby Magistrates ex pane B [1995] 4 All 
ER 526, Lord Taylor CJ said:
'... if a balancing exercise was ever required 
...it was performed once andjor all in the 
sixteenth century. No exception should be 
allowed to the absolute nature of legal 
professional privilege.'
The dire effect was to prevent an 
accused on trial for murder establishing 
his innocence. The decision has been 
criticised: for one thing, there are other 
exceptions already; and the Lords relied 
on purely civil precedents. But the law 
must be taken as settled, subject to a 
small window left open by Lord 
Nicholls's obiter dictum in the case: that 
where a client no longer had any interest 
in maintaining his privilege, it might be 
treated as spent.
PRIVILEGE FOR SALARIED 
LAWYERS
Back to the White House. How would 
our courts have responded to the type of 
claim for privilege made by Bruce 
Lindsey? Lindsey, a lawyer and one of the 
President's closest advisers and 
confidants, refused to answer questions 
before the grand jury as to what the
President had said to him by way of 
response to Kathleen Willey's accusations 
of Oval Office gropings. On appeal, 
Lindsey was ordered by the Court of 
Appeals to answer. To the English reader 
this may at first seem puzzling- TheJ 1 o
explanation is that privilege never arose 
because Lindsey's relationship with 
Clinton was that of a government- 
employed lawyer advising a government 
official. The American Law Institute's 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 
( 1996), para. 124d, deals with the matter:
'Government lawyers may be prohibited 
from the private practice of law or accepting a 
matter adverse to the government. Thus the 
fact that the common employer of both lawyer 
and officer is a government agency may affect 
the reasonableness of the officer's claim of 
expectation that the lawyer could Junction as 
personal counsel to the officer.'
So the test appears to be twofold: 
whether the President expected Lindsey, 
as a government employee, to be able to 
safeguard his disclosures; and, if he did so 
expect, whether this expectation was 
reasonable. If this problem seems not to 
have arisen in Lngland, it may be because 
or the cloak of Crown privilege, latterly 
public interest immunity, thrown over 
virtually all communications at 
governmental level and almost 
impenetrable until recently. However it 
could arise here within a non- 
governmental organisation, in which case 
it might seem unfair if privilege were 
denied. An employee of a company may 
well consult privately one of his 
colleagues, who happens to be a lawyer 
employed by the company, for personal 
advice unconnected with their 
employment. No fee is asked or paid. 
Would both of them be compellable to 
disclose to a court what passed between 
them? Does it turn on whether the 
lawyer's employment allows, or 
precludes, his advising outside his work? 
If so, is he bound to inform his quasi- 
client before too much is said? For most 
purposes, courts both here and in the 
USA treat employed lawyers as 
independent professionals even though 
advising their own firm or company. (See 
Upjohn v US (1981) 449 US 383,391; and 
Alfred Crompton v Customs &^ Excise [1974] 
AC 405, in which case the clients and the 
lawyers were both part of the same 
government department.) The privileged 
status is of course for the benefit of the 
employer as against its opponents. But by
parity of reasoning the same status could 
be claimed where an employee, litigating 
in person on a purely private matter, 
sought to withhold from disclosure 
communications to or from his employed 
lawyer-colleague, purporting to act as an 
independent professional.
THE PROFESSIONAL 
CODES
On this, the American Restatement para. 
212 perhaps concedes a little:
'A lawyer may not represent both an 
organization and its director, officer, 
employee, shareholder, etc., if there is a 
substantial risk that the lawyer's 
representation of either would be materially 
and adversely affected by the lawyer's duty to 
the other.'
This could mean merely that a lawyer 
in private practice must not act for both 
of two clients in potential conflict with 
each other. Could it also mean in the case 
of an employed lawyer that if the 
representation is wholly outside any 
context or concern of the employer, the 
off-duty lawyer may take it on and 
thereby attract privilege? From personal 
experience it is not uncommon for 
university start to seek legal advice fromJ o
their law-teacher colleagues. So long as 
the matter has nothing to do with their
o
university employment, it should be 
recognised as privileged. The Law 
Society's Employed Solicitors Code 1990 
(1997 revision) applicable to solicitors 
who are employed by non-solicitors, 
states that, subject to there being no 
conflict of interest or breach of the usual 
professional standards, and to the 
question of insurance:
'An employed solicitor may act for (a) a 
fellow-employee; (b) a director [etc.] of the 
solicitor's employer ...' (para. 2)
As to government-employed lawyers, 
para. 9 of the Code states that they:
'... may in carrying out the functions of 
the employer give legal advice to other persons 
and in the case of statutory functions may act 
generally for such persons.'
On a lair reading ot this, it seems 
specific to and even enlarging their 
employed functions, but in no way 
detracting from the permissive para 2 . Yet 
in their commentary, the learned editors 
of Cordery on Solicitors paraphrase para. 9 
ambiguously, stating that they:
'... may only give advice to other persons in 
the course of carrying out the functions of the 
employer ...' [emphasis added]
The matter remains to be tested. What 
the Code makes quite clear is in para. 1 (e):
'Where an employed solicitor is acting for a 
person other than that employer in accordance 
with this Code, any information disclosed to 
the solicitor by the client is confidential and 
cannot be disclosed to the employer without 
the express consent of the client.'
This brings us to examine
O
confidentiality.
PRIVILEGE AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY
These two overlapping concepts need 
to be distinguished. Privilege (in England 
confined to lawyer and client 
communications) confers the common 
law right to refuse to answer questions in 
court, or to produce documents, 
concerned with seeking or giving legal 
advice, without being guilty of contempt; 
and also to prevent one's lawyer 
answering. Confidentiality, supported by 
equity, is primarily a professional-ethical 
duty on the lawyer not to reveal his 
client's confidences. It is more general in 
that it covers all manner of client matters, 
and every possible outlet of leakage.
CONFIDENTIALITY AS A 
BACK-UP
In the USA in recent years, the 
protection surrounding a privileged 
relationship has been extended by 
Federal Rules and State Codes so as to 
prevent disclosure by unauthorised third 
parties, whether eavesdroppers, 
interceptors, or others, who by their own 
initiative have wrongfully acquired 
privileged information. In this country 
we have not yet taken this step. Once a
privileged communication gets into ther o o
hands or hearing of a third party, the 
privilege is pro tanto destroyed (see, e.g. 
Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759; R v 
Tompkins (1978) 67 Cr App R 181). 
However in the all too frequent 
occurrence where careless lawyers allow 
privileged documents to be seen by 
opposing parties, it seems that our two 
jurisdictions have much the same 
approach   which here, at least, is to 
invoke the residual confidentiality 
remedy. A lawyer who unexpectedly 
receives materials which appear 
confidential and not intended for him is
supposed to not read them and to inform 
the sending lawyer (see, e.g. Berg 
Electronics v Molex Inc (1995) 875 F Supp 
61; English SL American Insurance v Herbert 
Smith [1988] FSR 232). Where the 
receiving lawyer is not aware of the 
mistake until after reading the 
documents there is no breach of ethics, 
according the DC Bar Legal Ethics 
Committee, Opinion 256 (1995). Where 
the receiving lawyer reasonably assumes 
that there has been voluntary discovery 
by the sending lawyer, there is no remedy 
for the negligent sender (Pizzey v Ford
O O • J
Motor Co (1993), The Times, 8 March). So 
in IBM v Phoenix [1995] 1 All ER 413, 
424 the test applied was: would the 
mistake be obvious to the hypothetical 
reasonable solicitor? If it would be, then 
an injunction may be granted to prevent 
use of the documents or information.
THE DURABILITY OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY
In the Swidler case (cited above), the 
Supreme Court had to decide only the 
limited question of whether lawyer-client 
privilege survives the client's death, not 
the wider one of how long it may last. As 
to this, various American authorities have 
suggested that it should be capable of. 
expiration by, for example, effluxion of 
time, or by the windinp-up of a deceased
' J O 1
client's estate. Since in England the 
privilege seems to be everlasting, such 
innovations in US law would pass us by. 
But they could be helpful by analogy in 
suggesting limits on the confidentiality 
aspect. Much depends on the 
comparative effect of the two duties. In 
privilege the client is saying 'even in 
defiance of a court I can prevent my 
lawyer from answering'. Can he add, as to 
confidentiality, ''how much more so can I 
prevent him from disclosing to all and 
sundry'? ('And if I, then also my 
successors?') Or is the duty of 
confidentiality innately more vague, weak 
and transitory?
It is not difficult to find dicta stating 
that it, too, is permanent and absolute. 
Thus in US v Standard Oil Co ((1955) 136 
F Supp 345, 355):
'The confidences communicated by a client 
to his attorney must remain inviolate for all 
time if the public is to have reverence Jbr the 
law and confidence in its guardian . . . The 
client must be secure in the belief that the 
lawyer will be forever barred from disclosing 
confidences reposed in him.'
In the recent 'Chinese walls' case, 
Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 WLR 215, 
225G, Eord Millett reasserted the 
lawyer's duty in the strongest terms:
'Whetherfounded on contract or equity, the 
duty to preserve confidentiality is unqualified. 
It is a duty to keep the information 
confidential, not merely to take all reasonable 
steps to do so. The former client ... is entitled 
to prevent his former solicitor from exposing 
him to any avoidable risk; and this includes 
the increased risk of the use of the information 
to his prejudice ..."
The particular prejudice in both cases 
was the prospect of the lawyer's making 
use of information acquired while acting 
for a client when subsequently acting for 
a new client adversely to the former 
client. But the strictures may hold good 
for all situations which are potentially 
prejudicial.
Suppose an old firm of lawyers, 
clearing out their basement, found dusty 
files concerning some major public figure 
for whom they had acted in the dim past. 
Would they be safe to deposit these with 
an archive? If a putative descendant of the 
client were to appear and to demand 
non-disclosure, claiming perhaps to 
protect the reputation of the long- 
departed, what would be the lawyers' 
proper course? Should they shred, or 
hand over to the descendant, or apply to 
the court to be released from their duty, 
or return the files to their oubliette, or 
deposit and be damned? And if the last, 
what should be the response of the 
depositees to the claims of the 
descendant?
The final draft (1996) of the American
Restatement: The Law Governing Lawyers states:
'The duty of confidentiality continues so 
long as the lawyer possesses confidential client 
information. It extends beyond the end of 
representation and beyond the death of the 
client.'
It goes on to say that the lawyer must 
provide for 'the return, destruction or 
continued safekeeping of client files' in 
the event of the lawyer ceasing for 
whatever reason to practise. It does not 
advise further on which of these actions 
should apply in which circumstances; nor 
does it consider the conservation of 
historically important materials.
In England, the Law Society's Guide to 
Professional Conduct of Solicitors (7th edn 
1996) contains guidelines. The lawyer is 
to retain all files for at least six years 
because of the possibility of claims. After 
that the position may be reviewed. If 
there are documents belonging to the 
client, these must be offered back, or 
destroyed with permission. But the Law 
Society takes the view that lawyers' files, 
including original letters from clients, are 
the property of the lawyer. No authority 
is stated but this may be in reliance on Re 
Thomson (1855) 20 Beav 545 (obiter, 
Romilly, R) and Re Wheatcroft (1877) 6 
Ch D 97 (ratio, Jessel, MR). That being 
so, they recommend that those which (in 
the estimation of the lawyer) are of 
historical value may be deposited with the 
county archivist. What restrictions may 
be imposed on the archive as to access are 
not stated, save for the possibility of a 
subsequent claim of ownership. Those 
files which the solicitors consider to have 
no such value may be shredded.
NEED TO PROTECT 
DOCUMENTS & LAWYERS
This sounds like 'if in doubt, shred'. 
Destruction is of course the ultimate 
guarantee of non-disclosure. But much 
valuable material may be lost in this way. 
One would think that an archivist is a 
better judge of these things than a lawyer, 
save perhaps where it is a leading case 
with its background, rather than major 
public events or personages, that the 
documents would reveal. To offer an 
extreme example, some years ago I saw at 
auction a large box containing all the 
court documents, pleadings, 
correspondence, counsel's opinion, etc., 
in the case of Ashford v Thornton (1819) 
(the last case in which the right to trial by 
battle was claimed). These must have 
come ultimately from some lawyer's 
custody. There must be many similar 
collections from venerable causes celebres 
in lawyers' hands, of great value to legal 
and social historians. Yet in our unsettled 
state of law, depositing these with an 
archive may itself amount to a breach of 
confidentiality, inclining the solicitors to 
destroy. What is needed is a clear rule of 
law or of established practice, protecting 
both documents and lawyers. There are 
analogies. For official records in the 
Public Record Office, we have an initial 
thirty-year rule with exceptions and 
extensions. In copyright, we have seventy 
years from the death of the author.
Perhaps the government might give 
thought to adding this to the long- 
promised Freedom of Information Bill. 
Or we could have a more specific Legal 
Confidentiality (Termination) Act. Other 
professions may wish to come within it, 
but for present purposes I would offer 
something of this sort.
(1) Documents, records and all other 
communications or information in 
whatever form, which are protected 
by the principles of professional 
confidentiality between lawyer and 
client, shall cease to be so protected 
after a period of X years following 
the death of the client.
(2) The period of X years shall:
(a) in the case of a client who is an 
individual, run from the date of 
death of the client, or where there 
are joint clients, from the date of 
death of the last such client; and
(b) in the case of a corporate client or 
partnership or other association, 
from the date of its winding up or 
other dissolution, but subject to the 
right of any person to seek 
protection of confidentiality as for 
an individual.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall affect:
^ ' o
(a) the application of legal professional 
privilege;
(b) the right of any client or other 
person so entitled to make voluntary 
disclosure of confidential matters or 
to authorise any other person or 
body to do so;
(c) the confidentiality of any 
governmental or official informationo
or communication;
(d) the confidentiality of any 
communication by or to any 
member of the Royal Family;
(e) the right of any person or body 
representing the interest of a former 
client after the said period of X years 
to apply to the court for an order to 
maintain confidentiality or to 
restrict disclosure in whole or part; 
but the court in deciding such 
application shall have regard to any 
public or historic interest in favour 
of disclosure.
(4) It shall be lawful for confidential 
documents and other records to 
which this Act applies to be 
deposited in an approved archive 
before the expiry of the period of X 
years provided that:
(a) where such deposit is made by the 
lawyers, it shall be expressly subject 
to the continuance of the 
confidentiality for the remainder of 
the period;
(b) where such deposit is made by a 
client or by a person representing 
the interest of a client, it may be 
made subject to conditions affording 
restricted access as may be expressly 
attached to the deposit;
and the authority responsible for the 
archive shall from then to the end of 
the period maintain the 
confidentiality' accordingly
(5) Nothing in this Act shall operate to 
create confidentiality for any matter 
which was not protected by 
professional confidentiality before 
the passing of this Act.
(6) This Act shall come into force on 
[date] and shall apply retrospectively 
so as to release from protection any 
documents, communications or 
other information to which 
confidentiality previously applied if 
on that date the said period has 
already expired, but subject to this 
Act. ©
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